institutionalizing contention over EU issues will bring the EU closer to its citizens is a difficult yardstick to evaluate it by. A related issue is whether ECI campaigns which are highly critical of the EU might ultimately offer a pathway to legitimizing the EU; it is difficult to imagine how populist Eurosceptic demands could have such an effect.
The first institutional review of the ECI in 2017 reflects that 'the instrument has not achieved its full potential' (European Commission, 2017b, p.4) and records 'limited debate and impact so far generated by citizens' initiatives' (ibid, p.5). Commentators have pointed to key flaws in the design of the ECI, centred on its non-binding nature and the ability of the European Commission to dominate the instrument (Karatzia, 2017; Vogiatzis, 2017) .
Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that the ECI has political as well as institutional effects, a wider point about the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty covered by the introductory article and other contributions to this symposium (Hurrelmann and Baglioni, in this issue). A key political effect is that the ECI broadens the EU 'public space', although the way it might do so is ill-defined. What kind of public space does it broaden, and how? At a moment when the European Commission has proposed reforms of the ECI hailed by key activist NGOs as 'promising' (ECAS, 2017) , what contributions might these proposed reforms make to a broadened public space? Is the broadened public space essentially a political space surrounding EU political institutions, or is it a broader arena of public debate?
These questions are assessed in the analysis ahead by means of a section identifying the key features of the ECI, followed by a section that give an overview of the ECIs proposed in the mechanism's first five years. Based on this overview, this article identifies and assesses three key effects of the ECI beyond legislative change. This discussion is followed by an assessment of the impact which the new reforms of the ECI will have on these effects.
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The ECI: Design and Reform
The ECI is 'a tool for participation and for agenda-setting at EU level ' (European Commission, 2017b, p.4) . ECIs carry no power to mandate EU institutions, but can request the European Commission to propose a legislative initiative. In this latter respect, it has equivalence to powers vested in the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU (Karatzia, 2017) ; indeed, it is a design feature that the measure should not have powers which in any sense exceed those of the EP, given the primacy of representative democracy in the Treaties (Vogiatzis, 2017) . European Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans (who holds institutional responsibility for the ECI) very recently asserted in exchanges with the EP that the ECI is not an instrument of direct democracy (ECI Watch, December 2017).
Rather, it is one of a number of instruments of participatory democracy used by the European Commission, alongside measures such as public consultations and its established dialogue with civil society organizations, and itemized in the TEU as Article 11 (in the preceding Constitutional Treaty form, referred to as the 'participatory democracy' article). It involves a transnational campaigning process offering a mechanism of access to EU institutional deliberation for registered campaigns successful in acquiring, within a 12 month period, one million (verified) signatures from EU citizens from at least seven 1 EU Member States 2 . The organizing hosts of campaigns which reach this threshold have the opportunity to meet with the European Commission, and for their campaign demands to have a public hearing in the EP. The European Commission must then elaborate upon and publish its reasons for choosing a particular course of action or inaction.
An initiative must first be registered by the European Commission, requiring it to fulfil administrative and legal criteria, and, crucially, a test of admissibility. That is, the initiative must fall within the competencies of the European Commission to act, as laid down in the Treaties and interpreted by the European Commission's legal service. Thirty per cent of 5 proposed initiatives have fallen at this hurdle, of which six have challenged the ruling before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), two successfully. 3 Denied registration has been used by some campaigners as an attractive frame ('the initiative they didn't want you to sign') for unofficial signature collection, and thus refused campaigns are considered in this analysis, alongside registered initiatives, in terms of their ability to agenda-set topics in political institutions, introduce contention, and public sphere effects.
In sum, the ECI offers campaigners a means of institutionalized agenda-setting, strengthened by provision for a hearing in the EP and of which the European Commission takes account in making its response. Given that the ECI appears to challenge the Commission's right of initiative, some observers have wondered whether the Commission's approach to it might be luke-warm (Nugent and Rhinard, 2016) . In reality, the Commission has tried hard to make the concept work because of its structural interests in deepening the European project and seeking popular legitimacy for it. It has, since the early days of the ECI, lent its servers to campaigners because of the difficulties activists experienced in finding IT systems capable of complying with the requirements for data protection. It has established an advice centre in the Europe Direct Contact Centre to answer directly questions from would-be organizers, including advice on the legal admissibility of envisaged initiatives.
Almost all of the refused registrations, all on the grounds of legal eligibility, were in the first two years of the operation of the ECI. Advice will be further strengthened by a new proposal to establish a dedicated online collaborative platform (European Commission, 2017b Treaties for it to act, whereas previously the Commission treated partial eligibility as a reason for refusal. All of these events have led to the initiative enjoying a period of renaissance, following a 'doldrums' period after its first two years of experimental use when a number of initiatives were refused registration on the grounds of eligibility.
The ECI is the world's first transnational citizens' initiative mechanism. Relative to citizens' initiatives in national or regional jurisdictions, the ECI pales against the mandatory powers to be found in Switzerland and California (Allswang, 2000; Lutz, 2012; Smith and Tolbert, 2004) , but shares with others (particularly in Europe - Qvortrup, 2012; Schiller and Setälä, 2012a; Schiller and Setälä, 2012b ) a similar effect of agenda-setting (often lesserknown) issues from civil society, without enforcement powers. In doing so, it offers something different from the EU's established practices of dialogue with organized civil society as the best available proxy for an otherwise absent civil society. These practices are commonly found among international organizations because of the ties they lack which would otherwise connect them with citizens, centred on the absence of a government in (Greenwood, 2015) . As is described later, the ECI has primarily mobilized a different set of activists from those working in professionalized NGOs in the ecosystem of organizations surrounding EU institutions in the 'Brussels bubble.'
The ECI in Action
Five of the forty signature collection campaigns completed to date have met the threshold: Despite this apparent dependence of campaigns on established patrons, a key innovation of the ECI is a public transnational campaigning process leading to a formal mechanism of political access, and thus quite different from other EU practices of participation based around elite dialogue with interest representative organizations as an imperfect but best available proxy for civil society. In reinforcement of this, Commissioner
Maroš Šefčovič, the patron of the ECI in the European Commission at its outset, stressed that the ECI is 'not for NGOs, but for all citizens ' (EurActiv, 2011) . Campaigns hosted by established advocacy organizations have been notably fewer than those emerging from freshly drawn campaign teams (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014; European Parliament Research Service, 2015) . It should also be noted that the measure has delivered fewer registration requests than the political patrons of the ECI first imagined, attributed to the bureaucratic and legal hurdles in the first years of its operation (Berg and Thomson, 2014) .
Apart from the requirement for the establishment of a Citizens' Committee of seven individuals from seven different Member States, these (presently 5 ) carry personal legal responsibility for the protection of data during the process of collecting signatures.
In terms of a policy response, the European Commission refused point blank to meet any of the demands of One of Us (with little appetite from the EP to try to persuade the Commission otherwise). Stop Vivisection met with statements of sympathy for the demands as long-term goals, but little by way of policy action. Right2Water met with a partial (and continuing) policy response from the European Commission. However, given its weak powers, the yardstick for success of the ECI lies not in its ability to achieve policy change, but in other effects (European Commission, 2015; Bouza Garcia, 2015; Conrad, 2016) . It must be recognized that ECI campaigns have a range of motivations, including networking, positioning, and the creation/institutionalization of organizations (Pfafferot, 2013; Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014) . Initiatives would also seem to have the power to: broaden the range of topics under consideration by political institutions; introduce contention to EU politics; and to create public discussion about them. These aspects are considered in turn below, including the potential for development through the proposed reforms of the ECI.
Three Evaluative Criteria for the ECI (1) Broadening the range of topics under consideration by political institutions:
In terms of the first criterion, broadening policy agendas, examples of unconventional issues introduced to the EU political system include the following ECIs (® =refused registration, on interpretation by the Commission's legal service that the proposal lies outside of the scope of the current EU Treaties for the Commission to act):
• End Legalised Prostitution in Europe®;
• End Ecocide in Europe (criminalization of the deliberate or reckless destruction of the natural environment) 6 ;
• Turn me Off (switching off lights in offices and shops at night);
• Kündigung Personenfreizügigkeit Schweiz (end the Free Movement of People Agreement between the EU and Switzerland);
• Let me Vote (full voting rights for cross-border EU citizens in adopted state);
• An end to front companies;
• European Free Vaping Initiative (take vaping products outside the scope of regulation as a tobacco or medicinal product);
• Weed Like to Talk (legalize Cannabis);
• 30km/hour -making the streets liveable (urban and village speed limit);
• Suspension of the EU Climate & Energy Package;
• Pour une gestion responsible des déchets contre les incinérateurs (for responsible waste management, against incinerators);
• Unconditional Basic Income 7 ;
• One of Us (stop embryo stem cell research);
• Retaining European Citizenship (for cross-border citizens affected by Brexit);
• Sing the European Anthem in Esperanto 8 .
• We are a welcoming Europe, let us help (including immunity from prosecution for those offering humanitarian assistance to migrants).
Initiatives proposing 'lesser known' issues are an ideal means of agenda-setting, whereas mainstream issues are championed by established NGOs with more conventional ways of pursuing their cause than an ECI. New campaigns have predominated the applications for ECI registration (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014) . For ECIs without an established patron or ready access to networks of supporters, there seems limited prospects to achieve the one million signature threshold. For these campaigns, the Petitions Committee (PETI) of the EP has signalled its willingness to treat those under the signature threshold in the same way as it would give consideration to an ordinary citizen petition, with the ability to recommend that the EP uses its powers to request the European Commission to bring forward a legislative initiative, i.e., with similar effect to that of a successful ECI (Vogiatzis, 2017) .
A striking feature of ECI campaigns to date involves the disproportionately strong presence among Citizens' Committees of the 21-30 age cohort, whose share constitutes around twice that of each of the next nearest groups, 31-40 and 41-50 (European Parliament Research Service, 2015 ; see also Gherghina and Groh, 2016 (2) Contentious Politics: The Laeken Declaration preceding the Lisbon Treaty expressed an explicit aspiration that contention over issues in EU politics would help to 'bring the EU closer to its citizens' (Hurrelmann and Baglioni, in this issue). A number of the exemplars of broadening agenda-setting also serve as examples of contentious politics, meaning that initiatives go against the grain of EU public policy. Bouza Garcia and Greenwood (2014) undertook an analysis of 60 signature campaigns, 10 and rated 25 as contentious. Prominent among these are initiatives whose registration was (at least initially) refused:
• Bouza Garcia and Greenwood (2014) found that consensual campaigns were more likely to be associated with movers already well linked to EU politics, whereas outsiders were more likely to introduce topics which challenged the direction of travel of EU public policy. Among the registered campaigns were two with clearly Eurosceptic demands, Abolish the European Parliament, and Confidence Vote on EU Government. It seems a stretch to suggest that such topics might somehow be a pathway to bring the EU closer to its citizens. ECIs can be registered provided, inter alia, they would not undermine fundamental human rights, the rule of law, or democracy. Three of the four successful signature collection campaigns took issue with the direction of specific EU policy initiatives, to varying degrees.
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One of Us is the most clear-cut case, in that it challenged EU funding of embryonic stem cell research, and the European Commission refused outright to meet any of the demands of the initiative after taking stock of the positions of the co-legislators (Karatzia, 2017 Garcia and Greenwood, 2014; Karatzia, 2017) , joined in some cases by Member States. As with contentious politics more generally, these have attracted the interest of the media (see, for instance, Marks and Paravacini, 2017) , and create more public discussion than subjects which follow the broad direction of travel of EU policy initiatives, which are largely unchallenged by organized interests or Member States. mechanism to the point that it became a key sticking point in transatlantic negotiations.
The example is significant, because the regulatory emphasis of EU competencies and correspondingly technical character of much EU legislation is a core difficulty in making issues amenable to public discussion, as any cursory glance at the list of topics/files open on the Europa online consultation portal would confirm. The STOP-TTIP! campaign seems to have broken through this barrier by presenting a rather technical issue in an amenable form for public discussion, and in doing so bringing a high degree of contention to public spheres. Conrad refers to the STOP TTIP! initiative as an example of an issue which 'can lead to a conflict-induced awakening of the European public sphere' (Conrad, 2016, p.76) . A qualification is that the initiative's success in mobilising opposition against TTIP had relatively little to do with its origins as an ECI, other than to frame the initiative as something the EU Commission did not want people to sign.
It should be emphasised that creating public discussion does not by itself lead to the creation of contentious politics. There are plenty of initiatives which have made relatively straightforward demands on political institutions which bear no claim to contest the broad direction of policy travel, but rather to add policy provision. Examples include initiatives calling for a plain for sustainable development and employment, and initiatives aimed at at strengthening exchange programmes or the recognition of European qualifications.
The ECI's impact on democracy
The consequence of these criteria involves the potential for democratization, in which a key ingredient is held to be public contestation. As Follesdal (2015, p.261) that 'public spheres emerge through the public debate of controversial issues' and points out that, '[t]he more we debate issues, the more we engage each other in our public discourses, the more we actually create political communities'.
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These considerations raise the question as to whether the ECI is best captured as (1) a wider European public sphere; (2) a narrower European political public sphere involving contestation and campaigning for political resolution; or in different terms as (3) a 'polity activating device [as part of a] polity under constitution' (Saward, 2013, pp.228-236) . Van de Steeg takes forward this latter notion of the public sphere as a polity, in which 'the political community from which the public debate emanates is the point of departure' (Van de Steeg, 2010, p.32) . Such a political community is formed of 'a collection of common spaces or fora in which citizens can publicly exchange ideas, opinions and information on problems they encounter while living together in the same polity' (ibid, p.39).
In line with the first conception -a European public sphere -is a claim by Conrad (2016, p.65 ) who refers to the Right2Water campaign as the 'remarkable awakening of a transnational public sphere'. Some direct democracy campaigners estimate that it takes five conversations to convert into one signature. 12 The process of campaigning therefore offers at least the prospect of a political public sphere, i.e., public discussion on political issues. This offers an intriguing prospect, because the ECI results in citizens in different Member States discussing the same issues simultaneously. It also offers the opportunity to 'download' European issues into national arenas. The Right2Water campaign left a legacy for campaigners against the introduction of water charges in Ireland, framing a national campaign within the explicit demands and symbols of a European campaign. Protesters on rallies were spotted waving Greek flags, in a sign of solidarity with the fiscal crisis there (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2016) .
The legal framework of the ECI is at least set up for a transnational political public sphere. Together, these factors raise the possibility of a transnational political public sphere, and a more permissive basis than those accounts which render the EU as inherently unsuitable for democracy due to its status as an international organization primarily concerned with technical regulation (Kohler Koch, 2012) . Jügen Habermas (1995; 2001) has addressed the question of a European political public sphere in a number of short contributions. Whilst much of the focus of these involves the need for a constitution for Europe, he has identified how there could be 'a political public sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance' (Habermas 1995, p.306) . For Habermas, this would be constituted from the 'flowing contents of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalisation of citizens' communication'
(ibid, p.306).
The ECI is therefore a close fit with the conditions established by Habermas for the establishment of a political public sphere. It is a mechanism in which the stabilization and legitimization of the discourse takes place through some kind of institutionalization in the form of a 'space' with specific rules and procedures of interaction' (Knaut, 2016, p.58) . The effect of this political communication is politicization, which is 'about political conflict and the intensification of political debates in the public spheres' (Risse, 2015a, p. 14) , in which the latter plural is intended to convey recognition of debates about Europe, in particular, in a plurality of territorial contexts (local, national, transnational) (Risse, 2015a; 2015b) .
The design concept of the ECI follows a key criterion presented by Risse for the Europeanization of public spheres in which 'fellow Europeans are present in the various national and issue-specific public spheres as both speakers and audiences' (Risse, 2015a, p.10) . Greenwood and Tuokko (2017) Minority Safe Pack, related to ending cross-border data use charges), followed significant television and radio coverage in particular, due to nationally organized campaigns (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017) . Notably, the Bulgarian mobilization follows a pattern in which trade unions provide a key bridge between the spheres of public contestation and EU politics, in which conflict plays a central role (Crespy, 2014) .
Greenwood and Tuokko (2017) (Greenwood and Tuokko, 2017) . There are opportunities built in to the process for further public deliberation, through improved reasoning given in cases where registration is refused, an increase in the time period for the Commission to prepare its response to allow for consultation of other EU institutions and of stakeholders, and the involvement of a wider range of public stakeholders in the hearings of the EP.
The reform measures proposed will clearly make it easier for campaigners and wouldbe signatories alike, such that an increase in the flow of campaigns can reasonably be expected to at least maintain the diversity of topics introduced to the EU policy agenda.
These are likely to continue to offer topics which challenge EU public policy agendas to varying degrees, and public debate will follow an increase in campaigning activity. The easier entry thresholds for campaigners are likely to lead to an increase in 'outsider' organizations using the mechanism, which in turn is likely to lead to an increase in contention orientated ECIs. These seem likely to go beyond the expansion of an EU political space, into a broader public space. Karatzia (2017) focuses on ways in which institutionalized mechanisms can deliver further public deliberation. These range from the inclusion of a deliberative platform for all ECIs to allow website visitors to comment on ECI proposals, to mechanisms designed to 21 draw the Council (which was conspicuously absent from ECI hearings) in to ECI debates (European Ombudsman, 2017; Karatzia, 2017 (Vogiatzis, 2017, p.264) . A related idea is for the Commission to formally transmit the ECI to the EP and Council for an institutional response to its Communication, with the effect of institutionalizing debate and contention.
Conclusion
The ECI was promoted as a key innovation to boost the democratic features of the EU, but in an ill-defined way. The five-year point since its inception offers a good moment to evaluate it. There have been fewer campaigns than its patrons in the European Commission imagined, (Follesdal, 2015, p.261 ).
Most of these campaigns resulted in counter-mobilization by producer interests, drawing them into public communication. The successful campaigns have brought institutionalized mechanisms of deliberation, while other campaigns have brought public discussion of issues, often providing novel EU frames, with no small degree of contention. Nonetheless, the jury is still out on whether institutionalizing contention over EU issues will bring the EU closer to its citizens, while a greater stretch of imagination is required to see how contentious politics with a critical EU character is ultimately likely to lead to legitimation of the EU.
There seems to be plenty of supporters for the idea that there is a transnational public sphere, albeit of segmented national publics. How the ECI addresses these is significant, because it fulfils the Habermasian criteria of citizens from different countries discussing the same topics of the same relevance at the same time, with a legal institutionalization of citizens' communication. A transnational public sphere seems ill-defined, but the policy orientation of the ECI offers a pathway to greater precision as a transnational political public sphere, in which contentious politics is clearly present, and in which contention is institutionalized over EU issues. There remain legislative issues which have attracted European-wide public contention (see, for instance, the account given by Dür and Mateo, 2014 , involving public mobilization over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ACTA), and in which the ECI has not featured. But the ECI has provided an institutionalized opportunity for contention, with political effects.
1 Before Brexit, this was intended to be a watermark of one-quarter of EU Member States.
2 Signature thresholds per country are weighted in relation to the size of populations.
3 Successful challenges were launched by Minority Safe Pack (Case T646/13) and STOP TTIP! (Case T754/14), both now registered in modified format. 4 At the time of writing, signatures for this campaign have yet to be verified. Following this, there would be a policy response from the European Commission, a hearing in the EP and a meeting with the ECI organizers. 5 The new reform proposals remove this liability by the establishment of a new legal structure for the host committees of campaigns. 6 This initiative was first version refused registration, then registered in revised format.
7 This initiative was initially refused registration, later registered in modified format.
8 This was not, as some initial coverage assumed, a prank, but a proposal originating from within the European Esperanto Association.
9 Some of the ECIs which appeared at an early stage of the measure have been registered as part of coursework on a Masters course in European integration, at Sciences-Po Paris.
10 These include 'pilot' unofficial campaigns run in the period immediately before the ECI commenced.
11 Both campaigns were subsequently registered as ECIs; Minority Safe Pack involved registration of those parts of the demands which were held by the CJEU to fall within the jurisdiction of the Treaties (Case T-646/13).
12 Conversation with Carsten Berg, now at the ECI Campaign.
13 For instance, celebrity chef Jamie Oliver endorsed STOP TTIP! ('I really don't want beef with growth hormones, nor chicken washed with chlorine … and I certainly don't want our farmers undermined', STOP TTIP!, 2018), and fashion designer Vivienne Westwood supported End Ecocide (End Ecocide, 2018) .
